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Executive Summary
The United States and China have a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship where substantial areas of cooperation coexist with ongoing strategic tensions and suspicions.
One manifestation involves disputes and incidents when U.S. and Chinese military forces interact within China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Three high-profile incidents over the last decade have involved aggressive maneuvers by Chinese military and/or paramilitary forces operating in close proximity to deter U.S. surveillance and military survey platforms from conducting their missions. Why do these incidents continue to occur despite mechanisms designed to prevent such dangerous encounters? Could new or different procedures or policies help avoid future incidents?
The problem in the U.S.-China case lies not with inadequate rules (for maritime operations) or history of practice (for air operations), but rather in the motivations that sometimes drive the Chinese to selective noncompliance with their provisions. China regards military surveillance and survey operations in its EEZ as hostile, threatening, illegal, and inappropriate.
China's harassment of U.S. naval vessels and aircraft conducting surveillance and survey operations is intended to produce a change in U.S. behavior by raising the costs and risks of these operations.
The U.S. military has confronted this problem before. U.S. doctrine and operational practice in conducting and responding to surveillance operations derives primarily from Cold War interactions with the Soviet military. The two countries were eventually able to develop a mutually beneficial protocol, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), for managing air and naval interactions, thereby reducing the potential for an incident to occur or escalate. Given the success of INCSEA and tactical parallels between U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-China interactions, the factors that led the Soviet Union to seek an agreement provide a useful prism for evaluating the current situation.
Three primary factors motivated the U.S.-Soviet agreement: concern over the escalation potential of future incidents, a growing parallelism in the nature and scope of surveillance operations, and a burgeoning period of détente. These factors do not presently exist in the U.S.-China relationship to the degree necessary to induce mutual restraint in maritime and air interactions within China's EEZ. This situation may change over the next 10 to 15 years as Chinese global economic interests expand and naval modernization produces a more capable and active Chinese navy, but waiting for change is not an attractive solution given continuing operational risks and the potential for an incident to badly damage bilateral relations.
If U.S. policymakers seek a faster change in Chinese behavior, they need to understand the underlying Chinese policy calculus, how it may change over time, and potential means of influencing that calculus. Based on Chinese policy objectives, official statements, patterns of behavior, and logical inferences, we identify seven decisionmaking variables:
1. Sovereignty/security concerns: These reflect China's historical concerns about sovereignty and the economic importance of defending China's coastal provinces.
2. Intelligence/counter-intelligence: China needs to gather strategic and tactical intelligence and also seeks to limit intelligence collection by potential adversaries.
3. Geostrategic considerations: China has concerns about the U.S. role in Asia, needs a stable external environment that supports development, desires to shape international rules and norms, and seeks to project a positive international image. 4 . Chinese domestic context: Aggressive efforts by Chinese naval and maritime forces to defend sovereignty bolster their relative importance and justify increased resources. However, the Chinese navy also seeks to show that it can protect China's interests and safeguard China's economic development, missions that require cooperation with foreign militaries.
Global commons access: Assured access to the global economy for resources and to
reach markets is essential for continued Chinese economic growth and development. Given the importance that China places on sovereignty, no single option is likely to be sufficient. A mixed approach, particularly one that influences more Chinese decisionmakers, may maximize the probability of success. Cooperative approaches require time for benefits to accrue and for normative arguments to be heard and heeded. Some potential coercive approaches require violating preferred U.S. norms of freedom of navigation and U.S. military standard practice of safe airmanship and seamanship to generate the leverage necessary to alter Chinese behavior. This risks shifting international norms in undesired directions and would create greater tension and friction in military-military relations and bilateral relations generally.
Introduction
The United States and China have a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship where substantial and expanding areas of cooperation coexist with ongoing strategic tensions and suspicions. China's rising economic and military power raises concerns in the United States about how a stronger China will behave. Chinese leaders describe a "trust deficit" that impedes bilateral cooperation; some believe the United States is encircling China and seeking to contain its rise. Mutual suspicions and the competitive elements of the relationship have deepened in the last few years. In the case of the EP-3 incident, the Chinese pilot's maneuvers resulted in a collision that damaged the EP-3 and resulted in the loss of the Chinese aircraft and its pilot. Each incident significantly raised tensions between the two militaries and disrupted military-military cooperation (in the EP-3 case, military-to-military contacts were suspended for more than a year).
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Moreover, these episodes have occurred despite a number of mechanisms designed to lessen the chances of dangerous encounters between U.S. For the air domain, the situation is more problematic. Universally agreed and codified proce- and regards the risks of a collision or incident escalating into a major conflict as limited and Maritime interactions were less numerous during this phase due to the coastal nature of the Soviet navy and its limited overall capabilities, which were significantly inferior to those of the U.S. Navy.
By the early 1960s the balance between air and maritime incidents began to shift toward a greater number of dangerous maritime encounters. This dynamic was driven by enhanced Soviet navy capabilities including more out-of-area deployments, the introduction of intelligence-collection ships into the Soviet inventory starting in the 1950s, and increased Soviet maritime commercial activity (including a large Soviet fishing fleet operating near the United States and increased Soviet merchant activity to and from Cuba). 23 The eventual elimination of direct overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. aircraft and the growing relevance, and use, of space-based reconnaissance assets contributed to the decreased severity of air incidents.
The general pattern of increasingly dangerous maritime interactions continued throughout the 1960s, tracking the growing reach and capabilities of the Soviet navy. Increasing concern over the severity and escalatory potential of these incidents eventually led the United States to propose talks with the Soviets to address the problem and seek resolution. Initial mediation efforts were rebuffed, but U.S. statements of concern were one of a number of factors that and intelligence-collection operations by both countries were once again on the rise. 25 Rather unexpectedly, from the U.S. perspective, in late 1970 the Soviets finally relented to American desires to discuss these incidents at sea.
26
Three issues motivated both sides to seek agreement. These included heightened concern over the escalation potential of future incidents, a growing parallelism in the nature and scope of each side's surveillance operations, and a burgeoning period of détente between the United States and Soviet Union. While there is insufficient information to determine the precise weighting of these factors in driving the two sides toward mutual restraint, available evidence suggests that escalation control was likely the most important. 27 Mutual restraint was especially important given the zero-sum and global nature of U.S. Common concerns about the risks of escalation (and the importance of reducing that risk) do not presently exist in the U.S.-China situation to the degree necessary to induce mutual restraint. Not only are the number and severity of current incidents much less than in the Cold
War, but also U.S. concern about the potential for escalation is much more pronounced than it is for the Chinese. In addition to traditional concerns about military escalation, both the United States and China have more to lose if a military incident turns into a major bilateral political issue that impedes U.S.-China economic and international cooperation. However, the Chinese also appear to judge that this risk is acceptably small. (Given that decisionmaking in China is complex and involves a multitude of actors and organizations, with their own motivations and interests, it is far from certain that there is a unified Chinese view of escalation potential and the risk to the broader bilateral relationship.)
Parallelism in Surveillance Operations
During the period of the most intense maritime interactions in the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet militaries conducted roughly parallel naval and air surveillance operations against each other.
Each side operated under the premise that these operations were a valuable, legitimate, and normal means of doing business. Although China employs air and naval surveillance assets, it has a limited ability to duplicate U.S. maritime and air surveillance operations and lacks the ability to monitor U.S. maritime activities on a global basis. This mismatch in operational capabilities means that the United States benefits more from the lack of restrictions on such activities and that China sees limited value in accepting U.S. surveillance activities in its EEZ because it is unable to undertake parallel operations that might yield equal dividends. This mismatch hinders the ability of both sides to reach consensus on the legitimacy and appropriateness of the operations. Soviet leadership more concerned about negative international perceptions of their harassment of U.S. military forces and the potential for inducing anti-Soviet sentiments in other countries. 32 In that case, the potential influence of nationalism upon domestic populations favored compromise.
Political Context of Military Competition
Regarding the ability to separate military and political issues, China has been unwilling to decouple the specific military issue of EEZ operations from overarching political issues. Unlike the Soviets, China remains steadfast in linking specific military issues to the broader political context; this has made it impossible for the MMCA to agree on operational procedures that work around underlying political disputes. This may partly be a function of the importance of sovereignty in the Chinese context; the issue is not more or less effective counterintelligence, but is tied up with the Chinese conception of the importance of sovereignty and the PLA's special role in defending that sovereignty. Chinese strategic culture is deeply rooted in using a top-down approach to security issues. Chinese officials repeatedly emphasize that a mutually beneficial political environment is a precondition for dealing with contentious military issues. 33 The United States, colored by its experience during the Cold War, believes that a bottom-up approach focused on common interests remains viable and that solutions to difficult military problems can be achieved despite broader, irresolvable political disputes.
Relative Military Capabilities
China is reducing the U.S. military advantage via its naval modernization efforts and development of shore-based antiaccess/area-denial capabilities, but this effect is geographically limited to waters near China. The PLAN's shift from a purely coastal navy to one with more potent regional capabilities mirrors the increased Soviet emphasis on maritime capabilities starting in the 1950s. 34 The current situation roughly resembles the Cold War circa the early 1960s, with a somewhat more active Chinese regional naval presence. Improving PLAN capabilities have not created the relative balance that existed between the U.S. and Soviet navies in the immediate runup to INCSEA.
Interservice Rivalry and Civil-Military Relations
The INCSEA agreement raised the Soviet navy's status and clout in interservice politics and was compatible with the civilian emphasis on détente. However, it is not clear that the PLAN would derive similar benefits from an agreement. The opposite is likely true: the navy's front-line role in defending Chinese sovereignty is a source of clout in interservice debates, generates public support, and justifies increased resources for naval modernization.
Importance of Commercial Shipping
China is much more dependent on ocean-borne commerce than the Soviet Union 
How the Soviet and China Cases Differ
The 
The Chinese Calculus on EEZ Issues
This analysis suggests that U.S. policymakers cannot apply lessons from negotiating the The primary hurdle is China's perceived sovereignty and national security concerns stemming from the U.S. operations in China's EEZ. Assuming the United States will continue these operations, the success of any initiative will depend upon reducing or offsetting these concerns.
U.S. efforts to establish a comprehensive set of air and maritime behavioral norms with China Geostrategic Considerations. China has at least four concerns. The first involves China's attitude toward the U.S. strategic role in Asia. Despite Chinese assurances that it accepts the United States as an "Asia-Pacific nation, " 37 some Western analysts believe that China may pursue a long-term objective of eroding U.S. influence in Asia. 38 Successful Chinese efforts to constrain the U.S. military's ability to operate in an antiaccess/area-denial environment could reduce U.S.
regional influence and loosen bonds between the United States and its regional allies and partners. This would enhance China's ability to achieve its regional objectives, including favorable settlement of territorial disputes in the South and East China seas.
A second consideration involves China's need for a stable external environment that allows a continued focus on domestic economic and social development. China values cooperative external relationships and a positive public image to help ensure external issues do not disrupt internal progress. Aggressive efforts to challenge U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific risk unsettling the regional security environment and impacting China's ability to focus on internal development.
A third consideration involves China's broad willingness to accept international rules and norms that they believe reflect the interests of powerful Western states. China has benefited immeasurably from most of the rules and norms in the current international system, but some 
Changing the Chinese Calculus
The importance of sovereignty and other variables detailed in the decisionmaking model highlights a number of potential avenues of approach in altering the Chinese policy calculus and thereby influencing Chinese behavior. Our analysis begins with a narrow focus on approaches to intelligence and counter-intelligence issues, which mainly involve elements of the PLAN, China's paramilitary forces, and Chinese intelligence community. We next consider broader naval and maritime approaches that involve other elements of the PLAN, the Chinese foreign policymaking apparatus, and Chinese shipping interests. We then consider strategic approaches that attempt to connect the EEZ disputes to high-level issues of concern to Chinese national policymakers. In addition to moving from low-level functional issues to high-level strategic issues, this organizational approach also recognizes that one potential means of altering a Chinese decision is by changing which Chinese actors are involved in deciding the issue.
Intelligence/Counter-intelligence Approaches. These approaches attempt to alter the Chinese calculus by linking China's own ability to gather intelligence with its tolerance of intelli- interests. This is a risk, but given the Chinese transactional approach to negotiations, it may be a necessary one. Similarly, some of the options discussed above require more assertive U.S. actions (including the threat to escalate minor incidents) that are not consistent with the long-term U.S.
desire for a peaceful and cooperative relationship with China. However, such actions may be necessary to broaden the Chinese actors involved in the issue, alter the Chinese policy calculus, and produce agreement on restraint.
Conclusion
The continuing pattern of dangerous U.S.-China air and maritime incidents in China's EEZ is not the product of a lack of clear international rules and norms. Rather, it is the result of China's interpretation of what military activities are allowed inside its EEZ and its willingness to violate established rules and norms to deter U.S. surveillance activities. If the United States hopes to change China's behavior, it will need to understand China's underlying calculus and adopt policies that can affect the variables in that calculus and produce different Chinese behavior. This paper has outlined key variables in the Chinese policy calculus and identified avenues of approach the United States might use to alter that calculus.
It is not self-evident that this is a major problem. This paper does not address the intelligence value of U.S. operations in China's EEZ, but one finding from the comparison with the U.S.-Soviet experience in the Cold War is that both the United States and Soviet Union suffered much greater losses in terms of personnel, ships, and planes. Current U.S.
operations are not producing unacceptable operational risks or excessive damage to bilateral relations. On the other hand, it is not clear that this tolerable status quo will continue indefinitely. China has the ability to significantly increase the level of harassment of U.S.
assets, and a "threat that leaves something to chance" may produce a collision or accident that causes significant loss of life, with unpredictable consequences for the relationship. 
